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BOOK REVIEWS 
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE 
WITHOUT TRIAL. By Donald ]. Newman. Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co. 1966. Pp. xx.vii, 259. $8.50. 
Conviction is the second volume to appear in The American 
Bar Foundation's Series on the Administration of Criminal Justice 
in the United States,1 though it will be the fourth of five volumes 
when the series is complete. The series is the outgrowth of field 
studies conducted by The American Bar Foundation in 1957 in 
Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin. 
Professor Newman's volume, as its full title indicates, treats those 
cases that are disposed of through a formal judgment but without 
a full-scale trial on the merits. The two significant forms of dispo-
sition are the plea of guilty, either to the offense charged or to a 
lesser included offense, and the judicial judgment of acquittal that 
bars further prosecution of the matter. Both dispositions tend to be 
lost sight of in traditional studies of the system of criminal law 
administration. 
As Professor Newman points out at length, the courts have co-
operated in creating practical inducements to pleas of guilty. The 
primary inducement is toleration, and in many instances encour-
agement, of plea bargaining between the prosecuting attorney and 
the defense attorney; as a reward to the defendant for saving the 
state the expense of a trial, the prosecutor accepts a plea of guilty 
to a lesser-included offense, or sometimes to an offense that bears 
no legal or logical relationship to the offense originally charged.2 
Plea bargaining cannot exist without at least the tacit approval of 
the judge who accepts the plea tendered by the defense attorney 
(though technically by the defendant himself) once the prosecuting 
attorney indicates his agreement. The secondary inducement is the 
fact that in most cases the defendant who pleads guilty is more likely 
to receive probation, a lower minimum or maximum sentence, or 
both, depending on the sentence structure in the criminal code, than 
the defendant who is convicted following trial.8 The high incidence 
of pleas of guilty bears witness to the efficacy of this free enterprise 
system in which admissions of guilt are traded for the time and 
expense of trial. 
The system of plea bargaining is indispensable to the criminal 
law process, for reasons both practical and theoretical. The practical 
reasons are based on statistics.4 The caseload on the criminal docket 
1. The earlier volume is LAFAVE, .ARREsT: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY (1965), reviewed in 64 MICH. L. REv. 1181 (1966). 
2. See ch. 6. 
3. See pp. 99-104. 
4. See pp. 3·6. 
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is about as heavy as the judicial system can handle; increases in the 
number of cases presented for adjudication will only produce addi-
tional delay in the trial of those cases. But the cases tried represent 
only about IO per cent of the cases in which an indictment or infor-
mation is presented. If even half of the 90 per cent of the defendants 
who now plead guilty should request trial, the judicial system would 
break down from overload. Though in the abstract a society should 
immediately respond to an increase in the number of cases to be tried 
by a corresponding increase in the numbers of judges to try them and 
courtrooms in which they may be tried, as a concrete matter the 
community responds only very slowly to these pressures. Therefore, 
what results is an increased delay in trying criminal cases and a 
more cursory trial of the cases once they reach the head of the 
docket. As an illustration of the process, one need only look at the 
strains evident in the federal court system because of the flood of 
habeas corpus applications from state prisoners and the counterpart 
strain on state appellate procedures as state prisoners endeavor to 
exhaust their state remedies. 
The plea bargaining system is also necessary from the point of 
view of criminal law theory. Rigid definitions of criminal conduct 
and mandatory prison terms, whether achieved through mandatory 
minimum sentences for crimes like first-degree murder or sale of 
narcotics, or through exclusion of certain offenses from the list of 
crimes in which probation is possible, require plea bargaining, for 
nobody wishes to apply them in even a majority of cases that fit the 
legislative definitions. However, the necessity of imposing a prison 
sentence can be avoided5 only through entry of a judgment for 
some other offense. At other times the individualization of criminal 
justice that flows from plea bargaining gives formal recognition to 
the "respectable" social status of the defendant, the "disrepute" of 
the victim or complainant, the need of the defendant for special 
hospitalization or other treatment, or the normality of the formally-
prohibited conduct within the subculture to which the defendant 
belongs. 6 In still other instances, plea bargaining is a means of rec-
ognizing "imperfect" defenses when the substantive criminal law 
in form seems to offer a choice only between complete criminality 
and complete freedom from criminal responsibility.7 
The function of individualizing justice is also performed in some 
instances through outright acquittal, when even a conviction of a 
lesser-included or a petty offense appears too harsh.8 Certain acquit-
tals, however, are motivated not by a desire to protect the individual 
5. See pp. 112-17. 
6. See pp. 117-25. 
7. See pp. 125-30. 
8. See chs. 10-12. 
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defendant against the harshness of the criminal law, but rather by 
a desire to control law enforcement practices.9 Functionally, this 
use of acquittal by judicial fiat bears a close relationship to the 
invocation of exclusionary rules of evidence to discipline law en-
forcement authorities.10 If a judge finds a constitutional or eviden-
tiary basis for excluding evidence that is the key to a conviction of 
the defendant, he makes it possible, as a practical matter, for the 
defendant to avoid conviction. But there is not always evidence 
subject to suppression. In that event, if a judge believes that a crim-
inal statute should not be invoked at all, or should not be utilized 
against the defendant or the group to which he belongs, or if he 
believes that the police have overstepped the bounds of decency in 
dealing with the defendant or other citizens in the same group or 
situation, he may enter a judgment of acquittal. If he chooses, he 
may state informally that this judgment is not intended primarily 
to benefit the defendant, but instead is directed toward the police 
and prosecutor. In almost every state, the trial judge may do this 
with impunity, for the state rarely can resort to appeal or super-
intending appellate control to obtain a ruling that the trial judge 
acted improperly, and even if it can, the individual defendant al-
most always has the protection of the double jeopardy concept 
against retrial on the pleading under which he was acquitted.11 
Thus Professor Newman's study shows that plea bargaining and 
judicial acquittals exist because without them our present system 
of criminal law administration could not operate justly, if, indeed, 
it could function at all. It is futile to talk of abolishing either pro-
cedure unless we prefer the alternative of complete breakdown of the 
system. There are, however, lessons here for those who would draft 
a modern criminal code. Mandatory minimum sentences for any 
crime should be eliminated entirely. No class of offenders should 
be declared by the legislature ineligible for probation or parole. 
"Imperfect" defenses should be recognized formally as mitigating 
the degree of the offense that has been committed in form. The 
court should be permitted to reduce the punishment classification 
for the offense, or in some instances dismiss the proceedings because 
the offense is trivial in comparison with the hardship that will 
result from conviction and punishment. The possibility should exist 
at any stage of the proceeding to substitute civil commitment for 
criminal prosecution. To the degree that revisions of this nature 
are made, the need for plea bargaining and judicial acquittal will 
diminish and the institutions themselves atrophy. 
9. Professor Newman covers this in Part V, pp. 172-96. 
IO. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure); Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (confessions obtained during unlawful detention); Nardone 
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (wiretap evidence). 
11. See pp. 141-48. 
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Professor Newman's background in sociology12 has been espe-
cially conducive to a presentation that places the techniques of 
procedure against a backdrop of social reality. No traditional pre-
sentation by a lawyer committed to the methodology of case analysis 
could serve so well to challenge legislator, judge and attorney. I 
hope that this work will be closely read, indeed used as a handbook, 
by those who are interested in reform both of substantive and 
adjective criminal law. 
I am troubled, however, by one aspect of this work and its com-
panion volumes: the material that they present as if it were current 
is in fact rapidly becoming obsolete.13 This was true to a degree in 
Professor LaFave's book; it is even more evident here. That these 
books were not produced and published in 1960 rather than from 
1965 to 1967 is regrettable. Criminal procedure has changed dra-
matically within the last five years; one may say that the "half-life" 
of cases decided and materials gathered before 1960 has already 
elapsed. True, Professor Newman has endeavored to compensate 
for one major development after The American Bar Foundation 
study was completed, that is, the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright14 
and its aftermath. Plea bargaining in the past often could and did 
take place in the absence of counsel, though the unfairness of this 
in at least some cases was recognized by the Supreme Court years 
before Gideon was decided.15 After Gideon this is not proper in 
any felony case unless the defendant has waived his right to counsel 
-and waiver ought to be restrictively viewed. The Gideon rule 
probably is also applicable by now to any case tried in a court of 
record, and may be applicable in the near future to any case pleaded 
to in any court. The required participation by counsel in the plea 
bargaining process, and the appearances entered by lawyers who 
have not heretofore taken criminal cases, must certainly affect the 
plea bargaining process. Plea bargaining will no doubt continue, 
but both in externals and in content it may vary markedly from the 
practices described by Professor Newman on the basis of the 1957 
survey. 
One other significant development since Professor Newman's 
manuscript was written may also spell the demise or impairment 
of the plea bargaining system. As a result of the many Supreme 
Court decisions governing details of state procedure under the aegis 
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, and especially 
12. He is professor of social work at the University of Wisconsin and holds a 
joint appointment in the Law School of that University. 
13. I am also bothered by the relatively small number of illustrations and the 
frequency with which the ones which are used reappear without significant reinter-
pretation. The repetition diminishes their impact. 
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
15. E.g., DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947). 
February 1967] Recent Books 819 
Miranda v. Arizona16 and the expansion of its holding which one 
may expect in future terms of the Court,17 it is no longer, in one 
sense, the defendant who is on trial, but rather the state and its 
employees, particularly the police. Because what has been done im-
properly by the police cannot be redone correctly, there is an in-
creasing possibility that errors by policemen, and perhaps by prose-
cutors or judges, will in fact immunize a defendant against success-
ful prosecution. If so, defense counsel probably will, and granted 
the existence of this growing body of constitutional law, should in-
sist on a trial of the case so that he may present issues that would 
be foreclosed by a guilty plea. In this event, the percentage of cases 
disposed of through pleas will decline rapidly from the present 90 per 
cent. In short, Supreme Court activity may impel a breakdown of the 
system that the practices described in Conviction have come into 
being to prevent. Therefore, within a very few years we may per-
force have to treat Professor Newman's study as only history, the 
history of an institution as thoroughly outmoded as other procedural 
traditions scrapped through judicially-created fourteenth amend-
ment common law. 
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
B. ]. George, Jr., 
Professor of Law 
The University of Michigan 
17. For example, creating a derivative rule of evidence applicable to whatever is 
discovered as a result of leads in the defendant's otherwise inadmissible confession. 
